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SCIENCE COMMUNICATION: FREQUENTLY PUBLIC, OCCASIONALLY INTELLECTUAL
Science communication and the public intellectual: a view
from philosophy
Patrick Stokes
While science communication has become increasingly professionalised,
philosophers have been far less active in, and reflective about, how we talk
to the public. In thinking about the relationship between the ‘public
intellectual’ and science communication, however, philosophy has some
important contributions to make, despite the differences of content and
disciplinary approach. What, then, can both these professions learn from
each other about how to engage with the public - and the risks that this
might involve?
Abstract
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A few months ago, via a panel at the Australasian Association of Philosophy
annual conference, I realized a long-held, if admittedly modest, ambition: to get
philosophers and science communicators in the same room, and get them talking.
The reason for convening this panel was a suspicion that science communicators
have important things to teach philosophers about how to engage effectively with
the public. Scientists, on the whole, have long since gotten their act together on
how to talk to the public in a much more comprehensive and self-reflective way
than philosophers. (If that claim sounds wrong to scientists who find their outreach
work under-valued or discouraged by institutional pressures, remember it’s only
meant to be a comparative claim.) To those of us working outside the sciences,
science communication appears both impressively professionalized and generally
well-received by the public. And philosophers, like scientists, need the goodwill of
that same public — yet we only rarely engage with them. Socrates did his
philosophizing in the marketplace, talking with anyone he met, until they grew
sick of his questions and killed him. (I may be leaving out one or two important
steps here, but that’s sort of the gist of it.) Philosophers today, by contrast,
philosophize almost exclusively at the public’s expense, whether via taxes or
tuition fees, yet spend virtually all of their philosophically productive time talking
to other philosophers.1 This “present lack of emphasis on producing philosophy
1There are admittedly a small number of successful philosophy communicators working outside
the university system (figures like Nigel Warburton, Alain de Botton, and Damon Young) yet these
tend to be either ex-academics or at least university educated to postgraduate level.
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for the public,” as Greg Littman claims, “offends against the spirit of all of the
major movements of academic western philosophy” [Littman, 2014, p. 105]. More
practically, a context where little public understanding of or good will towards the
discipline exists leaves philosophy vulnerable to political attacks and budgetary
predations. Similar remarks can, of course, be made in regards to other Humanities
and even some Social Science disciplines as well.
Yet ‘philosophy communication’ has barely even begun to be thematized by
philosophers, and even when it is, there is implicit disagreement over what
philosophers should concentrate on. Is the goal to increase ‘philosophical literacy’
among the public, or to actually advance public discourse, even on minor topics,
using philosophical techniques and resources? Huss [2014] characterizes the
difference as one between a pedagogical approach, designed to foster
‘philosophical literacy’ among the public — a form of teaching by other means —
and an ‘applied philosophy’ approach. The latter does not just teach the reader
something about philosophy, but rather “places the reader in the position not of a
pupil, but of a fellow traveler, or perhaps an apprentice, participating in
philosophical analysis and experiencing the power of philosophy to solve
problems, debunk dubious claims, and achieve clarity” [Huss, 2014, p. 27]. While
admitting the distinction is not a hard and fast one, Huss argues for an applied
philosophy approach as better promoting philosophical competence, not merely
familiarity with names and jargon, among the readership. Pugliucci and Finkelman
[2014] also claim that the boundaries between teaching philosophy and performing
philosophy are ambiguous, whereas Jack Russell Weinstein insists that “teaching
people to do philosophy and doing it with them are two entirely different projects”
[Weinstein, 2010, p. 5]. I’ve found in my own practice that this distinction, if blurry,
does capture the different approaches required for different outlets and tasks. Some
websites or traditional media forms require versions of philosophy communication
— explaining the existing arguments or concepts for instance — whereas long-form
articles and magazine writing tend to favor the public philosophy model.
At first blush, this distinction may appear to mark a key difference from science
communication. The science communicator’s task is primarily pedagogical, even if
commentators differ on the precise aim and scope of that pedagogy. Doing science
with the public, in a way that discloses something new to the scientist as well as
their audience, is far less common; as Pugliucci and Finkelman [2014] note, even
‘citizen science’ initiatives largely restrict the ‘citizen’ participants to the grunt
work of data collection. Public priorities can of course be reflected in which
research programs are funded or pursued, but strictly speaking that doesn’t of itself
amount to the public taking part in the knowledge-generating activities of science
itself. Science has fairly well-defined institutionalized mechanisms and internal
norms, and public discussions and demonstrations are not themselves part of those
mechanisms or governed by those norms. A David Attenborough documentary or
a museum exhibit, or even the Huxley-Wilberforce evolution debate (or in our own
era, Bill Nye The Science Guy debating Ken Hamm on the same topic — what was
it Marx said about history repeating first as tragedy, then as farce?) may disseminate
scientific knowledge but they do not, in themselves, expand it.
However, I think this distinction between teaching the public philosophy and
doing philosophy with the public does have a particular relevance to science
communication, as the figure of the public intellectual is, in many ways, more
JCOM 16(01)(2017)C03 2
performative than pedagogic. If science communicators are to be public
intellectuals, they will therefore need to take heed of what this might mean for their
practice. And here, at least, philosophers might just have something to teach back
to science communicators.
Public
intellectuals vs
communicators
Philosophers are at a disadvantage with respect to at least one key task of public
engagement: reporting, articulating and contextualizing new findings. Scientists
may rightly bemoan the media’s tendency to exaggerate the significance,
immediate utility, or reliability of new research results, not to mention having to
pose for clichéd B-roll footage of staged white-coated flask-swirling and pipetting.
Yet at least they have findings to report, progress to exaggerate. The news may get
blown out of proportion, but there’s news to tell nonetheless. Philosophers by
contrast don’t produce findings with the same sort of breakthrough immediacy, let
alone solidity or general interest. We don’t do press conferences. So that aspect of
public communication is mostly foreclosed to us.
However, we can, and do, serve to put things in context. For instance, where an
ethical issue arises — say, whether self-driving cars should be programed to kill the
driver or a pedestrian in cases where there are no other options — media
producers, journalists, and commissioning editors often find it useful to call up a
philosopher to outline the problem and explain the different approaches that might
be used to answer it. That function really belongs more to the pedagogic approach
discussed above. And it is also what a good deal of science communication seems
to aim at: translating the contents of specialist literature(s) for the general public in
order to contextualize issues, from dinosaur discoveries to space probe landings to
disease outbreaks. The reader or listener comes away now knowing some of what
other people — namely scientists — already knew.
The role of the public intellectual, however, is arguably different: not merely a
one-way conduit between the relevant community of experts and the wider public,
but someone who actively tries to advance the discourse. Everyone comes away
knowing something they didn’t know before, because the activity of the public
intellectual illuminates things in a novel way. Science communicators can do this
too, of course. Some of the best science communication around climate change for
instance is clearly evaluative and normative, not merely describing what the
atmosphere is doing but conveying the urgency of addressing it. Or think of Carl
Sagan’s meditation on Earth seen as a pale blue dot by the Voyager probe, ending
with a call to cherish that speck all the more for its insignificance in the vast cosmic
stage. Yet one can’t help but notice there’s something philosophical about that
speech. And that is where the philosopher, for one brief moment, has the edge.
There is a long tradition of philosophers as public intellectuals, particularly in
France. Instead of sequestering themselves in the university, figures like Camus,
Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Arendt wrote plays, novels, reportage, and polemics. They
ventured well beyond the armchair: consider Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul
Sartre’s commission into the Vietnam war, John Dewey’s work exposing the
Moscow Show Trials, and so forth. That tradition has, however, largely faded from
view. Academic philosophers have largely, though never entirely, vacated the field.
Instead, the most visible contemporary articulators of philosophical questions
— What is time? Why is there something rather than nothing? Can we derive
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ethical rules from natural laws? — have been scientists, particularly physicists.
Many of those same ‘rock star’ public physicists, such as Neil Degrasse Tyson,
Lawrence Krauss, and even Stephen Hawking, have been outspoken denigrators of
philosophy even as they engage in discourse that is, recognizably, philosophical in
character [Stokes, 2017].
Philosophers might respond here by telling scientists to stay in their lanes and
leave the philosophy to the professionals. There’s something to that response, but
it’s also important to remember that the remit of the public intellectual (scientist,
philosopher, historian, whatever) is going to be somewhat wider than their
disciplinary specialization allows. The public intellectual’s role is not merely to
impart specialist information, but to break new ground in a given domain of public
discussion, and that will typically involve, as Paul Dicken [2015] notes, a far more
synoptic view than academic research allows.
Research and
engagement
Academics are often rightly suspicious of that extra breadth afforded by public
engagement; there’s an important disconnect between our self-conception as
‘public intellectuals’ and our self-conception as researchers. Academic training
involves inculcating norms of caution and respect for disciplinary boundaries, but
what we end up commenting on in public is often a very long way from our areas
of specialization. (I was once asked on live radio, out of nowhere, why puree isn’t
considered soup.) There is thus a standing risk of speaking outside our scope of
expertise. Yet that disconnect can in fact also be productive, creating new feedback
loops between our public engagement and our academic production.
My own experience provides a modest example of this. In October 2012 I published
a very short (about 800 words) piece called “No, You’re Not Entitled to Your
Opinion” on The Conversation website. The topic wasn’t in any way related to my
academic publications, which up to that point were almost entirely about a 19th
century Danish philosopher. But the piece, aided by its clickbait-y title and some
fortuitous retweets, went viral. A typical philosophy journal article probably has, if
we’re being honest, a readership in the low double digits. ‘No You’re Not
Entitled. . . ’ went live at dawn, hit 20,000 hits by bedtime, and thanks to a Dawkins
retweet was over 40,000 when I woke up the next day. Four years on it is nearing
the two million hits mark. It opened up opportunities to do all sorts of new forms
of public engagement — talks, radio, television, magazine writing assignments etc.
as well as periodic emails from some delightfully odd people — that would never
have happened otherwise. At the time of writing, it has just been revisited in a
Quartz article on the ‘post-truth’ era, resulting in more hits, more crank emails,
more media interviews etc.
I don’t tell this story to boast, as this is really a story of random luck rather than
merit. Rather, I want to report something curious: this public engagement work
which started as an add-on to my ‘real work’ has impacted on my research in a
positive way. I’ve begun producing papers on topics that have emerged from
outreach activities; the paper you’re reading now is one such example. The debate
occasioned by ‘No You’re Not. . . ’ and the issues of public trust, conspiracy theory,
and so on surrounding it made me go back and engage with the social
epistemology literature and produce academic work-ups of ideas that had begun as
popular pieces. Instead of simply popularizing academic ideas, I’ve also found
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myself feeding ideas worked out in the public space back into the academic
literature. Thinking of public engagement as one-way traffic, disseminating the
fruits of research to a passive audience, turns out to be only half of the picture. The
current flows both ways.
The dangers of the
public intellectual
However, we should acknowledge there are dangers involved in public
intellectualism. The first is that while concerns about ‘dumbing down’ complex
material to make it palatable to the public are largely overblown, there is a danger
of failing to convey nuances of reliability. Presenting a claim without all the
caveats, counter-arguments and so on that follow in its train can make it seem like
matters that are open and contested are actually settled. (Of course, scientists more
often encounter the opposite problem in public discourse: massively supported
positions being treated as more tenuous or open to dispute than they really are.
“Evolution is just a theory, you know. . . ”).
Secondly, because the public intellectual’s work takes place outside the governing
norms of their discipline, there is potential to make unjustified claims without
proper scrutiny. Experts can thus start putting out assertions that aren’t warranted
by the literature but inherit the gravitas of the speaker. Linus Pauling’s advocacy of
high-dose Vitamin C had nothing to do with his Nobel Prize winning research, but
his status no doubt gave his views on the topic an undeserved aura of reliability.
And while science and pseudoscience are at least tacitly distinguished by the
public at least some of the time, no such filter exists for ‘pseudophilosophy,’
because nobody has yet articulated what that might be. We use ‘philosophy’
interchangeably to refer to an academic discipline and a personal set of beliefs,
which is why when you tell people you’re a philosopher a certain subset will reply
by telling you that “Well, my philosophy is. . . ”. Anyone who wants to tell you
about “my science,” however, raises immediate red flags. So whereas the public
have at least a reasonable capacity to differentiate Brian Cox from Christopher
Monkton, it’s much less clear they know how to tell Peter Singer from Deepak
Chopra. A ‘scientist’ is understood as a credentialed title in way that ‘philosopher’
is not.
Thirdly, and I think most significantly, public intellectuals risk reinforcing the “sage
on stage” model of academic which, particularly in philosophy, has disastrous
consequences. Philosophy has a stubbornly persistent gender problem.
Philosophers as a professional class are overwhelmingly white, middle-class men.
Women make up just 24% of permanent academic philosophy posts in the U.K. and
21% in the US [Saul, 2012], and 23% in Australia [Goddard, 2008]. Women enroll in
first-year philosophy units at roughly the same rate as men, but drop out instead of
completing majors [Dougherty, Baron and Miller, 2015]. The reasons for this are
manifold, but it is increasingly believed the problem is connected to how we
implicitly present the category ‘philosopher’ to students. There is a striking
correlation between gender distributions across disciplines and how those
disciplines rate innate brilliance as an essential component of their field [Leslie
et al., 2015]. Philosophy is a disastrous outlier here, viewing raw talent as far more
important than any other discipline. We thus end up implicitly reinforcing the
outrageously false idea that philosophers are born, rather than made — hence you
either are one or you aren’t — and all the exemplars of these ‘born philosophers’
students are presented with are men.
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That doesn’t mean men shouldn’t be public intellectuals necessarily, so much as it
means we need to both promote more women and people of color as public
intellectuals. And we need to avoid ways of presenting the public intellectual as a
sort of oracular figure, a font of Delphic wisdom rather than a product of training
and ongoing hard work, and someone open to engagement with and learning from
the public as an interlocutor. Some public intellectuals model that very well, others
not so much. Socrates, one might add, was a fantastic exemplar of such an
approach. They still killed him, though. Something to bear in mind.
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